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The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing
the Admissibility, Sufficiency and
Credibility of Expert Testimony
by
EILEEN A. SCALLEN & WILLIAM E. WIETHOFF"
"I have spoken; you have heard; you know the facts; now give your
decision."
-Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 4th century B.C.E.
When a sieve is shaken, the husks appear;
so do a man's faults when he speaks.
As the test of what the potter molds is
in the furnace, so in his conversation is the test of a man.
The fruit of a tree shows the care it has had;
so too does a man's speech disclose the bent
of his mind.
Praise no man before he speaks,
for it is then that men are tested.
-Sirach 27:4-7
Perhaps nowhere else is the relationship between natural or so-
cial science and rhetoric' more practically dangerous and more theo-
retically intricate than in the civilized combat of trials. The practical
danger is clear, whether in adjudicating criminal guilt or liability for
* Eileen A. Scallen, Associate Academic Dean and Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law; William E. Wiethoff, Attorney, Bloomington,
Indiana (Ph.D. Speech, University of Michigan).
1. "Rhetoric" is a term that constantly begs for definition, as its negative connota-
tions (as in "mere," "empty," or "just" rhetoric) often overshadow the rich history of the
term, which originated in an effort to systemize the training of legal advocates. See
Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning and the Law of Evidence, 44
AM. U. L. REv. 1717 (1995). As used here, the term means argumentation or persuasion
directed at the creation of reality in the courtroom, and, in certain publicized trials, in so-
ciety-as reflected through the media.
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tortious harm; we do not want the trier of fact to render an irrational
decision based on unreliable expert testimony. Less obvious is the
theoretical intricacy of expert testimony. Unwary observers may
perceive that disputes are litigated, expert witnesses testify for one or
more litigants, and a verdict is reached within a process that excludes
rhetorical flourishes except from advocates. In fact, the testimonial
discourse of experts, though not cast in the elegant form of oratory,
has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert testimony, even that based on
natural or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique
context-the law-and thus requires a unique mode of criticism.
This article focuses on the ways in which the law reifies expert
testimony as "evidence" with "weight,, 2 and how the law fails to view
expert testimony as argument, the ultimate success of which rests
primarily on the persuasive power of the expert's ethos-the percep-
tion of credibility. We argue that while both the judge and the jury
have roles in the evaluation of an expert's ethos, the critics of expert
testimony have improperly accorded the dominant responsibility for
evaluating the expert's ethos to the judge, thus obscuring the fact that
expert testimony is, at bottom, "opinion," traditionally evaluated by
the trier of fact, often a jury. This swing of the pendulum-according
the primary role in evaluating the testimony of experts from the jury
to the judge-appears partly due to the fear that once these expert
opinions are placed before the jury, the American legal system is a
prisoner of the whims of twelve ignorant laypersons. We note, as
others have, that this attitude not only underestimates the compe-
tence of jurors but also misunderstands the function of the jury sys-
tem.3 In addition, we note that while courts might acknowledge the
2. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 580 (8th Cir. 1997) (Bright, J., dis-
senting) ("Because the district court erroneously excluded the expert's opinion that sug-
gestive interrogation techniques potentially tainted the children's testimony, defense
counsel's statements reflected only arguments of counsel, not evidence. With Dr. Un-
derwager's testimony, however, counsel's argument could constitute substance over
rhetoric.")
3. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 234 (Robert E. Litan
ed., 1993) ("Throughout this review, strengths of the jury emerge. A close look at a num-
ber of cases, including several in which jury verdicts appear mistaken, does not show ju-
ries that are befuddled by complexity. Even when juries do not fully understand technical
issues, they can usually make enough sense of what is going on to deliberate rationally.
and they usually reach defensible decisions."); Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to De-
cide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues: Some Data From Medical
Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 906 (1994) (While noting that additional study is war-
ranted, "[a]necdotes about the widespread malperformance of juries do not stand up to
systematic data .. ." which "indicate that juries are not systematically biased against doc-
tors and that in the preponderance of cases they make reasonable decisions.").
These scholars confirm what some jurists have learned through first-hand observa-
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existence of devices for controlling jury decisions when the evidence
is insufficient to permit a rational decision, such as summary judg-
ment, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict,4 the
same courts seriously underestimate the utility of these devices in
dealing with expert testimony based on natural or social science evi-
dence. We use the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
General Electric Co. v. Joiners as an example of how a court may
confuse the issues of admissibility, sufficiency and credibility of ex-
pert testimony.
However, we do not end with a civil procedure lecture. The con-
cern over the use of "junk science",6 in the courtroom is a genuine and
widespread societal concern. Thus, we conclude by arguing that care-
ful attention to actual expert speech, focusing on the objectionable
qualities of it, can generate more thoughtful understanding of societal
objections to expert testimony and efforts at law reform. We primar-
ily illustrate our argument by examining expert testimony in the trial
of Dan White, who shot and killed San Francisco Mayor George
Moscone and San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk on November
27, 1978. This testimony was the source of one of the trial's most
memorable images and one of the most reviled examples of "junk
science"-the "Twinkie defense."
By analyzing the in-courtroom management of the expert's ethos
and its ramifications outside the courtroom, we show that the prob-
lem of expert testimony cannot be resolved adequately simply by
turning judges into "amateur scientists."7 Instead, the problem with
expert witnesses must be addressed by confronting the problem at
bottom: Science and law speak different languages. A judge, even
tion. See Alex Kozinski, Post-Mortem Talks With Jury Enlighten Judge, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
8, 1997, at A21. The author, a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, admits that
his observations, made while sitting by designation as a district court judge, are "unscien-
tific," but observed, among other things, that "[o]ften they remember small details and
inconsistencies that neither I nor anyone on my staff had noticed. Not every juror re-
members everything, but very little passes by the jury as a whole." Id.
Finally, some scholars have suggested that jurors have an important function that is
separate and independent from their fact-finding role in the dispute resolution process;
jurors implement important societal value choices through their verdicts. See SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA
(1995); Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemol-
ogy and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994).
4. "Directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" or "JNOV," are
now called "judgment as a matter of law" in federal practice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
5. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
6. By "junk science," we mean expert testimony based on natural or social science
theories that are not accepted as reliable.
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
8. Cf. id. at 596-97 ("[T]here are important differences between the quest for truth
Apr. 1998]
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one trained in the scientific method, cannot alone translate the testi-
mony of expert witnesses into meaningful legal discourse The
judge, experts, advocates, jury, and, in some notable cases, the scien-
tific, legal and general communities must all play their parts to
translate expert testimony into a societally acceptable decision.
I. The Concept of Ethos
The power of an expert witness's testimony rests on the expert's
ethos, which can most readily be translated as character or credibility.
Although explanations of a speaker's ethos have evolved over time
and cultures, the concept of ethos was developed to help train orators
for the courts of ancient Greece. As it was used in ancient Greece,
the term ethos is generally translated as the speaker's reputation for
wisdom, virtue, and good will toward the audience. In its earliest
formulations, ethos is one of three modes of persuasion, along with
pathos (appeals to emotion) and logos (appeals to reason). Although
Aristotle considered all three elements to be necessary for persua-
sion, he apparently considered the speaker's ethos to be "the most ef-
fective means for persuasion."1  To Aristotle, proofs of ethos-or
competence, character, and benevolence-are drawn from self-
in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory."). See also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Galileo's Tribute: Using Medical Evidence in Court, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2055
(1997). Professor Dreyfuss elaborates on this theme:
[T]he values furthered by dispute resolution in the courtroom are very different
from the values furthered in the laboratory. Court judgments are designed to
end the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant while at the same time
reconciling them to the outcome. To have that effect, adjudication must occur
openly; it must give each side the sense that a full and fair opportunity to present
a case and rebut the other side's position was available; it must engage the com-
munity's sense of justice; it must occur in a time frame in which any problems
the defenant has been found to have inflicted can be remedied. Or, as Jasanoff
puts it, where science is truth-seeking, law is justice-seeking. Not only must jus-
tice be done, it must be seen to be done. Because adjudication is an enterprise
vastly different from the one in which scientists engage, scientists should not be
insulted that it requires processes that are very different from the ones they use.
Id. at 2062 (citing Janasoff, supra note 3, at 6-7, 21).
9. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 2074-75 ("the legal system that is partly to blame-
not for using juries and taking a liberal view on the admissibility of expert witnesses, but
for relying on legal fictions and words, such as causation, that have different meaning to
the legal and scientific communities").
10. ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC, T 1356a (J.H. Freese trans., 1975).
"We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: This is true
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is
impossible and opinions are divided."
Id. But for Aristotle, it is sufficient that the content of the speech make the speaker
"seem" to be truthful; it is not necessary for effective persuasion that the speaker actually
"be" truthful.
1146 [Vol. 49
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referential statements by orators and nowhere else. That is, the
speaker's general and pre-existing reputation is irrelevant."
Other ancient Greek philosophers, notably Plato and Isocrates,
disagreed. They argued that one's general reputation for virtue and
one's special authority on a subject are not only relevant but also es-
sential to persuasive advocacy. Plato does not use the term ethos, but
the concept is embedded in his dialogues regarding "true" or "right"
rhetoric. For Plato, "ethos defines the space where language and
truth meet are made incarnate within the individual."12 In Plato's
view, the only "good" rhetoric is that which expresses the truth that
dwells within the individual's soul: "Throughout the dialogues, Plato
is uncompromising in asserting this equation: Truth must be incar-
nate within the individual and a person's language must express (or
first, discover) this truth. 1 3
The difference between Plato's and Isocrates' conceptions of
ethos is one of metaphysical degree; Isocrates speaks more in terms
of the speaker's attempts to locate honorable role models for his
speech and efforts to develop an honorable reputation and less of the
actual nature of the speaker's soul.' In other words, for Plato, a
speaker's words are simply a conduit of the truth residing in the soul.
For Isocrates, it was not necessary to opine on the status of the
speaker's soul, for one could comprehend the speaker's excellence of
character through the speaker's reputation and the medium of lan-
guage. Isocrates' notion of ethos was later carried into Roman theo-
ries of advocacy by Cicero and Quintilian, who defined the ultimate
advocate as "the good man speaking well,"' s that is, the virtuous per-
son who has been trained in advocacy.
From a postmodern and poststructuralist viewpoint, the author-
ity of an advocate is a moot point because the authorship of any ad-
vocacy is not individual but intersubjective. No one possesses a
11. See T.B. FARRELL, NORMS OF RHETORICAL CULTURE 41 (1993). Farrell has
recently disagreed with the conventional interpretation of Aristotelian ethos but admits,
at least, that it is conventional to test credibility only within the actual saying of this proof.
12. J.S. Baumlin, Introduction to ETHOS: NEv ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND
CRITICAL THEORY xiii, xi-xxxi (J.S. Baumlin & T.F. Baumlin eds., Southern Methodist
University Press 1994).
13. Id. Indeed, consider this passage from one of Plato's dialogues in which Socrates
says to Phaedrus: "If we are to address people scientifically, we shall show them precisely
what is the real and true nature of that object on which our discourse is brought to bear.
And that object, I take it, is the soul." Plato, Phaedrus, in ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN
RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY xiv, 270e (J.S. Baumlin & T.F. Baumlin eds.,
Southern Methodist University Press 1994).
14. See, e.g., Antidosis, 339 (George Norlin trans., Loeb Classical Library 1954)
("[Flor who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of
good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud... ?").
15. QUINTILIAN, THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF QUINTILIAN 12.1.1.
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unique "voice." Instead, we express our ideas solely from our inter-
action with surrounding cultures, ideologies, and other influential
voices." Thus, critics who long for expert witnesses to speak authori-
tatively the "truth"-in the Platonic sense of ethos-are doomed to
frustration. In courtroom advocacy, one "truth" is opposed by an-
other "truth" in the form of opposing experts, and in the mind of the
postmodern skeptics, the end product of a trial is not truth or error
but rather a winner and a loser.
The battle over the evidentiary treatment of expert testimony re-
flects these alternative views of the ethos of expert witnesses. The
battle becomes especially heated in the context of expert testimony
utilizing natural or social scientific theories. The stakes are high in
these cases-whether measured in dollars in toxic tort cases or in in-
dividual liberty in criminal cases.
Our view of the ethos of the expert witness is neither as rigid as
the Platonic conception of the expert as the "truth-teller" nor as radi-
cally relativistic as the extreme postmodern view of the expert as "the
hired gun." Our approach to the problem of expert testimony is
grounded in modern pragmatism, which has its roots in the classical
tradition of Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian.'7 Although pragmatism
is subject to a variety of different definitions,'8 we describe pragma-
tism as a philosophical perspective that rejects the positivist belief in
an unchanging, objective, universal truth while at the same time re-
jecting the skeptical or relativist proposition that there is no truth.
Pragmatism recognizes the tentative and context-dependent quality
of knowledge, but posits that practical action is possible and neces-
sary in the face of this uncertainty. Pragmatism embodies respect for
the power of argumentation and persuasion in producing such action.
Professor Scallen has argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence, in-
cluding the rules regarding expert testimony, were written from a
perspective of pragmatism and should be interpreted from that per-
spective.19
Our pragmatic approach to the ethos of expert testimony is due
in part to our understanding of expert testimony as rhetoric, argu-
mentation, or persuasion," and in part to our understanding of the
16. See Baumlin, supra note 12, at xxx.
17. See Scallen, supra note 1, for more on the connection between pragmatism and
classical rhetoric. See also RHETORIC, SOPHISTRY AND PRAGMATISM (Steven Mailloux
ed., 1995); RECOVERING PRAGMATISM'S VOICE: THE CLASSICAL TRADITION, RORTY.
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION (Lenore Lansdorf & Andrew R. Smith eds.,
1995).
18. See Scallen, supra note 1, at 1733-34 nn.116-22.
19. See id.
20. While others might differentiate among these terms, we see them as essentially
synonymous and find the definitional debates over the terms singularly unhelpful and
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need to focus on the procedural constraints of the legal context in
which that speech is used. Thus, we first focus on the issue of admis-
sibility of expert testimony. However, where others quit, we con-
tinue-for the admissibility of expert testimony can only be consid-
ered in conjunction with procedural tools designed to control jury
decisionmaking to ensure there is sufficient evidence for a rational
decision. Finally, the issues of admissibility and sufficiency must be
considered in terms of credibility-the credibility of the expert in the
eyes of the jury and the credibility of the adversary system in the eyes
of the public. All of these elements must be considered to truly un-
derstand the ethos of experts.
H. A Pragmatic Approach to Distinguishing the Issues of
Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony
Under the prevailing view, presentation of expert testimony is a
straightforward process: The judge deals with issues of admissibility
and the advocates deal with issues of credibility. The judge "admits"
expert testimony as if it were an object, and the jury scrutinizes it for
its "weight"-the degree of worthiness of belief, under the lenses of
impeachment and rehabilitation which the advocates use to magnify
the flaws or the integrity of the testimony.
However, using this dichotomy of admissibility and weight over-
simplifies the communicative processes that contribute to the con-
struction of the ethos of experts. Our pragmatic view of expert tes-
timony sees it as a complex communication or "translation" process,
involving more than just the transmission of information to the jury
within the constraints of evidence rules. To better understand this
communicative process, one must look both backward and forward-
to see how the rules for constructing the ethos of experts are made,
how they interact with other procedural constraints and then are re-
vised in response to cultural perceptions and reactions to highly visi-
ble trials. In this section, we attempt to show how courts have fo-
cused on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony at the
expense of understanding how issues of admissibility, sufficiency and
credibility all work together to determine the ethos of expert testi-
mony presented at trial.
A. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The pragmatic approach to the problem of expert ethos first
looks to the rules of evidence within which the process of creation
and translation of expert ethos occurs, and then considers the origins
Apr. 1998] 1149
and purposes of these rules. As noted earlier, Professor Scallen has
argued elsewhere that the Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole were
drafted from a philosophical perspective of pragmatism.2 Moreover,
although most commentators focus primarily on Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 and 703 when discussing the particular problem of ex-
pert testimony, these rules were developed in connection with the
other provisions of section 700. The aim of section 700 was to liber-
ate expert testimony from the constraints of the common law rules
regarding expert testimony. 2
The rules of evidence represent the key constraints on the ad-
missibility of expert testimony. Despite these constraints, expert wit-
nesses are given extraordinary freedom in their courtroom speech,
freedom which creates heightened concern with their power to influ-
ence decisionmakers.
To appreciate the freedom of expert speech, one must recall the
evidentiary constraints placed on ordinary, or lay, witnesses. A lay-
person ordinarily may not give testimony in the form of an opinion or
conclusion. 3 A layperson may be permitted to testify in the form of a
"conclusion" or "opinion" when it represents an inference from
something he or she has perceived and the witness cannot practically
24
express it in a more precise or helpful way.
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 702-705 advisory committee's notes; see also GLEN
WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.3 (2d ed. 1995) (Rule 702 is "more expan-
sive" than pre-Federal Rule practice in the kinds of expert testimony authorized).
23. See FED. R. EvID. 602.
24. FED. R. EVID. 701. A wonderful example of "lay opinion" comes from the
movie "Fargo." In one scene, the chief of police of Brainard, Marge Gunderson, is ques-
tioning two prostitutes about the identity of two men whom she believes may have com-
mitted several murders:
Marge: Okay, I want you to tell me what these fellas looked like.
Woman 1: Well, the little guy, he was kinda funny-looking.
Marge: In what way?
Woman 1: I dunno. Just funny-looking.
Marge: Can you be any more specific?
Woman 1: I couldn't really say. He wasn't circumcised.
Marge: Was he funny-looking apart from that?
Woman 1: Yah.
Marge: So, you were having sex with the little fella, then?
Woman 1: Uh-huh.
Marge: Is there anything else you can tell me about him?
Woman 1: No. Like I say, he was funny-looking. More'n most people even.
Marge: And what about the other fella?
Woman 2: He was a little older. Looked like the Marlboro Man.
Marge: Yah?
Woman 2: Yah. Maybe I'm sayin' that 'cause he smoked Marlboros.
Marge: Uh-huh.
Woman 2: A subconscious-type thing.
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Why do we have these limitations on lay witness speech?
One justification is that the layperson is not qualified to testify
beyond what he or she has experienced/perceived first-hand. Yet we
know that individuals do not communicate their perceptions in a raw
"just the facts ma'am" fashion; ordinary mortals often express their
perceptions in interpretative language that can reasonably only be
called "opinions" or "conclusions." The second and stronger ration-
ale against the general admissibility of lay opinion is that a layperson
intrudes on the function of a juror by drawing conclusions or opinions
based on the facts perceived. This argument rests on the belief that,
as the ultimate decisionmakers, the jurors should draw their own
conclusions or opinions based on the first-hand observations of the
witnesses whenever possible.
In contrast to lay witnesses, expert witnesses are allowed to
speak much more freely in a courtroom. All a party needs to estab-
lish is that its expert has the education, training or skill at drawing in-
ferences that the jury does not have.' Until quite recently, federal
courts have been liberal in recognizing individuals as experts. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a person may be qualified as
an expert by experience or special training and may not need any
specific academic or professional credentials.26
Once qualified as an expert, a witness has freedom of discourse
that a lay person does not. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, ex-
pert witnesses do not have to reveal the bases for their opinions;
moreover, they do not have to base their opinions on facts that are
already evidence in the case. In addition, experts may base their
opinions on materials that would otherwise be inadmissible evi-
dence-such as hearsay statements-if such material is the type of
material reasonably relied upon by experts in the relevant field.' For
example, a sufficiently qualified doctor testifying in court about the
cause of a plaintiff's injury could base her opinion on the hearsay
statements of other physicians or nurses who, while not testifying at
trial, had contributed to the care of the plaintiff. These are freedoms
of speech permitted to the expert witness that are unavailable to or-
Marge: Yah, that can happen.
FARGO (Coen and Coen 1996). The exchange between Marge and the first woman would
most likely be an example of acceptable lay opinion, as it is based on the first-hand obser-
vation of the witness and, despite Marge's best efforts, the witness could not break her
opinion down into more specific statements. The second woman's description, however,
is more questionable. The woman herself admits that she has moved beyond a first-hand
description to impose a preconceived "subconscious" association that may be misleading
rather than helpful to the trier of fact. However, some lenient judges might even allow
this lay opinion.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
26. 1a
27. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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dinary lay witnesses.
One cannot examine the admissibility of expert testimony with-
out asking who must decide that issue-the judge or the jury. For to
"admit" the evidence means that it may be used as a basis for deci-
sion." In other words, is this evidentiary issue to be decided by the
judge like most other evidentiary questions under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a), or is this a question of relevance conditioned on fac-
tual determinations which requires the jury to take a role in the proc-
ess under Rule 104(b)?
The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. was clear that the determination is to be made by the judge un-
der Rule 104(a), but did not explain its reasoning." As Professor
Scallen has argued, this may be because the Court did not want to
address the inconsistency of its approach with its prior decision in
Huddleston v. United States,30 and, even more troubling, its decision
to prefer the perceived expertise of the judge over the perceived ig-
norance and incapacity of the jury in evaluating the credibility of
such expert testimony." But therein lies the rub-by giving the
power over the creation of the expert's ethos to the judge under Rule
104(a), the Supreme Court deprived the jury of one of its most cher-
ished historical functions-to evaluate credibility. Supporters of the
Court's decision will argue that this is not the case, since the jury still
controls what weight to give the expert's testimony. But this assumes
that the jury will hear the expert speak-which was not the case in
Daubert and many other toxic tort cases where the case turns on the
admissibility of expert testimony on causation.
32
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court held that matters of rele-
vance which rely on determinations of reliability are to be decided
under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b).33 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court held that issues of expert testimony on issues of science are
28. At times, however, it seems that critics of expert testimony equate the admission
of expert testimony with a jury verdict for the plaintiff, ignoring all other procedural con-
straints on the jury, such as other evidence rules, judgment as a matter of law (directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict) and the possibility that the jury just
might reach a decision that even the critics would reach.
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
30. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
31. See Scallen, supra note 1, at 1788.
32. See District Court Judge Takes Issue With Circuit Courts' Application of Gate-
keeping Role, 3 FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEws 1 (Issue 9: August 1997) (quoting the Hon.
Sam C. Pointer, Jr., United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Ala-
bama, speaking at an ALI-ABA conference in July 1997, "In general.... one would have
to say that the outcome of Daubert has been to restrict the use of opinion experts. And.
in general, it has tended to favor the defendants, who most recently are the ones objecting
to plaintiff's expert testimony in a variety of fields.").
33. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-91.
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matters of relevance that turn on the reliability of the underlying sci-
ence, but that these issues are to be decided by the judge alone under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a),' What if the Daubert Court had
been consistent with its precedent in Huddleston, and had made the
admissibility of expert testimony a Rule 104(b) question? The fun-
damental difference would be that the trial judge would have to share
the power to evaluate the expert's ethos with the jury. Certainly the
judge would have some power to exclude expert testimony; for ex-
ample, presumably no rational jury could decide that reading crystal
balls, tea leaves or Ouiji boards can tell whether Bendectin causes
birth defects. 5 It would be irrational for a jury to so conclude, and
the evidence would properly be excluded under Rule 104(b). 6 How-
ever, if reasonable minds could differ as to whether a particular
methodology could be used to show that Bendectin causes birth de-
fects, the jury would have to hear the expert testimony (as inter-
preted by the advocates) and then be instructed to disregard the tes-
timony as irrelevant if they could not find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that such studies are reliable.' The difference in approach
under Rule 104(a) and 104(b) goes to the heart of the matter-should
the judge alone have the power under Rule 104(a) to resolve issues of
expert credibility; should the judge have the sole power to determine,
by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the science is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admissible? Or, using the sufficiency standard
of Rule 104(b), should the judge look only to see whether a reason-
able person could find that the science is reliable-leaving the jury to
decide all credibility issues, whether in finding that the evidence is
unreliable and therefore irrelevant, or in finding that the evidence is
just not as persuasive as the evidence presented on the other side?38
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
35. See David L. Faigman, Elise Porter and Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball
at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Wor-
rying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1799 (1994) (analo-
gizing expert opinion in Daubert to predictions based on reading Ouiji boards or tea
leaves). Nor, presumably, can phrenologists predict a defendant's future dangerousness
based on the contours of a defendant's skull. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S.
Ct. 512, 522 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We are not
aware of any particular studies that have been conducted on this issue, but judging by the
disparaging comments that commentators have made about these methods, we assume
they agree that these methods would not produce meaningful predictions if put to such
tests.
36. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
37. See EDWARD J. DEVITr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE AND INsTRUCrIONS
§ 17.08 (4th ed. 1992).
38. This would certainly be better from a constitutional standpoint. One conse-
quence of the Daubert Court's decision to make the admissibility of expert testimony a
104(a) question is that it raises a potential constitutional problem in criminal cases. The
Apr. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Given the existence of more direct means of ensuring sufficient evi-
dence for rational jury decisionmaking, as discussed in Section B, and
the constraint of public rhetoric regarding experts, as discussed in
Section C, it is a mistake to make the judge the sole arbiter of the
ethos of experts.
B. The Sufficiency of Expert Testimony
Moreover, the role of the Federal Rules of Evidence in con-
structing the ethos of experts must be viewed in context with the role
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other procedural rules. 9
While a court may pay lip service to this consideration,4 ° few stop to
discuss seriously the consequence of taking the role of these other
rules seriously. The procedural posture in which Daubert came be-
fore the 9th Circuit was as a motion for summary judgment. Because
the only evidence that the plaintiffs could produce of causation in
that case turned on controversial expert testimony, the trial court
granted-and the Ninth Circuit eventually affirmed-judgment for
defendants as a matter of law. Assuming that the court correctly in-
terpreted the unreliability of the expert testimony in Daubert, the
court should have reached the same result if it had analyzed the issue
under Rule 104(b) rather than Rule 104(a). Close examination of
Rule 104(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 reveals that they
employ the sufficiency of evidence standard.4' Under this standard,
the question is whether a reasonable jury could make a decision
Court's interpretation of the federal rules arguably deprives a criminal defendant of the
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 was recently
amended to eliminate the provision that made the credibility of prior sexual conduct evi-
dence a 104(a) question, in part to deal with a similar constitutional defect. While it is
true that criminal defendants have no right to present irrelevant evidence, this argument
begs the question, because under 104(b)'s approach, the jury is the fact-finder as to
whether the evidence is unreliable and thus irrelevant. If they fail to find the factual con-
siderations, they are instructed to disregard the evidence. See DEVITT, supra note 37. §
17.08.
39. See generally William W. Schwarzer, Management of Expert Evidence, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 7 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1995)
(relating the issue of admissibility of expert testimony to other relevant procedural rules,
such as pretrial case management, discovery, and motion practice).
40. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)
("Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence pre-
sented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the
position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56.").
41. This, of course, also applies to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, formerly
known as the rule on directed verdicts and J.N.O.V., and now referred to as the rule re-
garding "judgment as a matter of law."
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based on the evidence before them. If the animal studies in Daubert
were as bad as the courts believed they were, the answer to this in-
quiry has to be the same under Rule 104(b) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.
Advocates of giving the exclusive role of admitting expert testi-
mony to the judge under Rule 104(a) suggest that application of Rule
104(b) would result in a flood of junk science, since any crackpot the-
ory can generate at least some evidence to support its reliability, and
would thus pass muster under Rule 104(b)'s sufficiency standard.
This simply is not accurate when one examines how the sufficiency
standard is applied in federal civil procedure. The standard for tak-
ing an issue away from a federal jury is the same, whether it is ap-
plied at the stage of summary judgment42 or during trial.43 The stan-
dard is that if no reasonable juror could find in favor of the party with
the burden of proof on the issue, then4)udgment as a matter of law
should be granted to the other party. However, case law makes
clear that a party cannot avoid judgment as a matter of law by pro-
ducing just some evidence to produce a factual issue-a scintilla of
evidence will not send the case to the jury. The United States Su-
preme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.4' reiterated the idea
that under the sufficiency standard, a judge need not send an issue to
the jury just because there is some evidence on both sides:
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of
evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to thejury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more
reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to thejury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether
there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which ajury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party produc-
ing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.
46
Under the sufficiency standard, the judge thus still serves as a
gatekeeper but does not use that role to usurp the role of the jury in
evaluating the credibility of the evidence.47
Applying this analysis to the evidence context, a party has the
burden of proving that the party's evidence is relevant, since only
relevant evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
42. See FED. R. Cv. P. 56.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (now called "Judgment as a Matter of Law"; formerly
called "Directed Verdict/JNOV").
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251 (1986).
45. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
46. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 442,448 (1872).
47. See iL at 255.
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As the Supreme Court concluded in Daubert, if expert testimony is
based on a scientific theory that cannot be shown to have probative
value, the evidence is irrelevant. But here is where the sufficiency
standard would make a difference. In order to exclude the testimony,
the trial court would have to decide that no reasonable person could
conclude that the testimony has probative value; certainly the case
with a Ouiji board or tea leaf readings, but not as clear in the context
of animal studies of the kind at issue in Daubert, and in the Supreme
Court's recent decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.4
The Joiner opinion most clearly demonstrates the federal judici-
ary's current confusion of the issues of admissibility, sufficiency and
credibility. Robert Joiner was an electrician in the Water & Light
Department of Thomasville, Georgia.49 In the course of repairing the
city's electrical transformers, Joiner sometimes immersed his hands
and arms in the transformer's coolant, even splashing the fluid on
himself, sometimes getting some in his eyes and mouth. ° About ten
years after he began work for the city, the city discovered that the
coolant in some of the transformers was contaminated with poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which are considered hazardous to
humans." Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer in 1991,
and sued General Electric and others, who had manufactured the
transformers and the coolant.52 Joiner alleged that, although he was a
smoker and there was a history of lung cancer in the family, his expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives, furans and dioxins, "promoted"
his cancer-that is, but for his exposure to these toxic substances, his
cancer would not have developed for many more years, if ever."
The defendants removed the state court action to federal court
and moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Joiner had no
evidence that he was significantly exposed to PCBs, furans, or diox-
ins, and (2) there was no admissible evidence that PCBs promoted
Joiner's cancer.54 Joiner opposed defendants' motion for summary
judgment, relying heavily on depositions from his experts, who testi-
fied that PCBs alone can promote cancer, that furans and dioxins can
also promote cancer, and that Joiner's exposure to PCBs, furans, and
dioxins was likely responsible for Joiner's cancer.55 The District
Court ruled that although there was a genuine issue of material fact
48. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
49. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (W.D. Ga. 1994).
50. See id. at 1313 n.6.
51. Seeid. at 1312.
52. See id. at 1313-14.
53. See id. at 1314.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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as to whether Joiner was exposed to PCBs, summary judgment
should be granted because there was no genuine issue as to whether
Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and whether there
was a link between exposure to PCBs and small cell lung cancer. 6
The court ruled that Joiner's experts' testimony was inadmissible,
and could not be used to oppose the summary judgment motion, be-
cause their testimony did not amount to more than "subjective belief
or unsupported speculation."57
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the District Court erred by finding there was no genuine issue as
to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins, as there
was evidence of that exposure in the record and that the District
Court erred in weighing the credibility of the conflicting expert testi-
mony. 8 The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court should have
restricted itself to determining the "legal reliability of proffered ex-
pert testimony, leaving the jury to decide the correctness of compet-
ing expert opinions."5 The Court of Appeals stated that it was ap-
plying a "particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's
exclusion of expert testimony" because the expert testimony rules
display a preference for admissibility °
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying a heightened standard of review
to the issue of the admissibility of the expert testimony; the Supreme
Court stated that the correct standard of review for evidentiary rul-
ings, including those on the admissibility of expert testimony, is abuse
of discretion.' The Supreme Court rejected a higher standard of re-
view, although the trial court's ruling was dispositive of the case, be-
cause "the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an
issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard."6 2
The Supreme Court's ruling in Joiner demonstrates the problem
of the Court conflating the issues of admissibility, sufficiency, and
credibility. First, by framing the question as solely one of admissibil-
ity, the Court ignored the application of the sufficiency standard that
is applicable to a motion for summary judgment. The Court asserted
that the admissibility of expert testimony was not a question of fact,
but, as in Daubert, it refused to explain why this is so when the rele-
56. See id at 1326-27.
57. Id at 1326.
58. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524,528 (11th Cir. 1996)
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id at 529.
61. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997).
62. Id
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vancy of the evidence turns on finding that the evidence is reliable-a
determination that the Court deemed to be a Rule 104(b) factual
question in Huddleston.63 Thus, although it disparaged the experts'
determination regarding the cause of Joiner's cancer as resting on no
more than "ipse dixit," the Court felt free to resort to that argumen-
tative technique itself. By refusing to review the district court's rul-
ing under the sufficiency standard, the Court confuses the question of
whether the evidence can be heard by the jury with the question of
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of liability by
the jury. Moreover, as Justice Stevens suggests in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the Court confuses the issue of admissibility and
credibility; he challenged his colleagues with this question: "[W]hen
qualified experts have reached relevant conclusions on the basis of an
acceptable methodology, why are their opinions inadmissible?"' Jus-
tice Stevens noted that the Court of Appeals found that Joiner's ex-
perts followed a scientifically acceptable method of weighing all the
evidence together. 6' Essentially, the Supreme Court and trial court
substituted their judgment of the persuasiveness of the experts' tes-
timony for that of the jury.
What would have happened if Joiner had been decided under
Rule 104(b), instead of Rule 104(a)? The first question would simply
be whether Joiner's expert testimony (in the form of depositions)
could be used to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. The trial court would have asked whether a reasonable jluror
could be persuaded by the experts that PCBs promoted Joiner's can-
cer; whether the trial judge herself was persuaded would be irrele-
vant. As the Joiner Court held, the trial court's ruling under 104(b)
would be reviewable, as all other evidentiary decisions are, for abuse
of discretion.'
Suppose the trial judge decided that the evidence could be used
to oppose the summary judgment motion. The second issue, whether
to grant summary judgment or not, again would be framed in terms
of sufficiency-is this expert testimony sufficient to support a finding
of causation? But now the question becomes whether this evidence is
the only evidence of causation. If, as in Joiner, the expert testimony
63. See Scallen, supra note 1, at 1788.
64. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 523 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. See id. at 522-23. Justice Stevens noted that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) uses the same method to assess risk, although with a higher standard, and
that the defendants used the same method in this case.
66. Id. at 517. Given the Court of Appeals' conclusion and that of Justice Breyer. if
the trial court ruled that the evidence was insufficient, we would have to say that the trial
court would be "manifestly wrong" to conclude that no reasonable person could be per-
suaded on the issue of causation by this expert testimony, and the decision would be re-
versed for a determination of the merits of the summary judgment motion.
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is the only evidence, then the question is whether this expert testi-
mony alone could sustain a finding of causation. However, that de-
termination is subject to the standard of review applicable to motions
for summary judgment, or other judgments as a matter of law-de
novo review.' Such a heightened standard of review is the appropri-
ate one where the trial court's decision has taken the case away from
the jury. To put it a different way, the Court of Appeals was correct
in finding that a heightened standard of review should apply to the
trial court's decision to exclude the evidence in Joiner, but not be-
cause it dealt with expert testimony, but rather because this scientific
testimony was the only evidence linking the exposure to PCBs to
cancer produced in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
The issue in Joiner was not "what standard of review applies to the
trial court's decision on the admissibility of expert testimony." The
only issue in Joiner was "what standard of review applies to the trial
court's decision that no reasonable jury could return a verdict based
on the scientific evidence presented in this case." The answer to each
issue was clear, but the Supreme Court muddied them by confusing
the, admissibility and the sufficiency of evidence.
C. The Credibility of Expert Testimony
Both commentators and courts decry the expanding use of scien-
tific expert testimony today. Critics of expert testimony based on
"junk science" seem to equate the decision to admit questionable ex-
pert testimony at trial with a jury verdict in favor of the side intro-
ducing that science. This ignores the fact that under our adversary
system, the opponent of the so-called "junk science" is present to ex-
plain the defects in the other side's expert testimony and present ex-
pert testimony of its own. In Daubert, the Supreme Court pointed to
the role of the adversary system in dealing with weak scientific evi-
dence: "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence .... 6" However, the Court's actions speak louder than
these words. By giving the judge control over the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony based on natural or social science evidence under
Rule 104(a), the Court betrays its irrational fear of the power of one
side's expert speech to control the jury. This is odd, given how easily
we are ready to dismiss such testimony as "mere" rhetoric.
The corollary of this fear of the Svengali-expert is an elitist con-
67. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §
2716 (3d ed. 1998).
68. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,596 (1993).
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tempt for the decision-making ability of the jury. Plato, the advocate
of "truth speakers," held popular juries in similar disregard.69 The
critics of junk science would solve the problem by conferring the
primary power to control the ethos of experts to the modern day
counterpart of Plato's philosopher-king-the judge. Yet, turning the
problem over tot he judge will not solve the problem of the credibil-
ity of expert speech. Indeed, even the existence of procedural tools
for ensuring sufficient evidence for jury decision-making will not
solve the problem, for we are faced with a series of conflicting mes-
sages. We respect the jury's decision-making ability but fear the
jury's decision-making ability. We know that juries need enlighten-
ment from experts but fear that experts have undue power over ju-
ries. It is important to examine actual expert speech to determine
what kinds produce public concern and why. Such analysis can lead
to more effective management of expert testimony in court, as well as
law reform that more adequately attempts to address societal objec-
tions to expert speech while preserving the role of the jury. We next
illustrate this process by analyzing the rhetoric of the experts in the
Dan White case.
II. The Ethos of Experts in the Dan White Trial
In this Section, we attempt to demonstrate how the speech of
expert witnesses can be criticized, not only to explain the societal
objections to "junk science," but also to show how improper expert
speech-that which cannot be adequately or acceptably negotiated or
translated-may lead to law reform.
Most of the facts in the trial of Dan White were undisputed. °
Dan White resigned his position on the Board of Supervisors for the
City and County of San Francisco on November 10, 1978, citing
overwhelming personal and financial difficulties which made him un-
able to perform his duties. Several days later, White changed his
mind, and asked Mayor George Moscone, who had the power to ap-
point White's replacement to the Board, to reinstate him as a Super-
visor. Moscone initially indicated that he would reappoint White, but
later changed his mind. Supervisor Harvey Milk, the first openly gay
man to hold the office, opposed White's reinstatement to the Board.
On November 26, 1978, a reporter informed White that Moscone
would not reinstate him.
69. See PLATO, GORGIAs 481-527 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Loeb Classical Library
1929); PLATO, PHAEDRUS 272D, 278B-D (discussing how jurors are easily swayed by an
advocate who values winning the case more than speaking the truth).
70. This account of the facts of the White case, as well as quotes from the trial tran-
script, are taken from KENNETH W. SALTER, THE TRIAL OF DAN WHITE (1991).
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The next day, at about 10 a.m., White had an aide drop him off
at City Hall. Instead of going through the front entrance which con-
tained a metal detector, White walked to the McAllister Street side
of City Hall and climbed through a basement window. He went di-
rectly to Moscone's office and shot Moscone four times, twice after
Moscone had fallen to the floor. White then reloaded his gun and
went to Milk's office, where he shot Milk five times, three times in
the body and then twice in the back of the head while Milk was on
the floor. Although White initially ran, he later surrendered himself
to the police, where he gave a full tape-recorded confession.
At the trial, White presented a defense of diminished capacity,
using the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Wells,
7
'
which held that evidence of diminished capacity, whether from in-
toxication, trauma or mental disease, could be used to show that the
defendant did not have a specific mental state such as malice afore-
thought, or could not premeditate or deliberate to the degree re-
quired for a conviction of first degree murder.' Thus, White pre-
sented expert testimony regarding his mental state at the time of the
killings. This expert testimony was the source of one of the trial's
most memorable images and one of the most reviled examples of
"junk science"-the "Twinkie defense," as the press referred to the
testimony of Dr. Martin Blinder. This defense expert testified that
when White became depressed, he ate large amounts of junk food-
Twinkies, Coda-Cola, etc. Moreover, Dr. Blinder testified that when
"susceptible individuals" like White consume "large quantities of
what we call junk food, high sugar content food with lots of preserva-
tives can precipitate anti-social and even violent behavior." How-
ever, what is now forgotten is that the defense did not rely solely on
the "Twinkie" theory; four other psychiatrists also testified for the
defense, uniformly agreeing that White suffered from depression to
such a degree that he possessed diminished capacity at the time of the
killing and could not premeditate or deliberate.
White was convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than first
degree murder. The verdict was greeted by outrage-in the gay
community, which believed that Milk's murder and the verdict were
the result of homophobia, and in the general public, which focused on
the defense of diminished capacity. The following case study at-
tempts to explore some of the cultural response to the expert testi-
mony presented in the White case and how that response resulted in
law reform.
Causal relations are arguably the natural domain of scientists
71. 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949).
72. People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949).
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and, more often than not, expert witnesses for the defense in the trial
of Dan White addressed cause and effect. The question posed at the
trial was not whether Dan White shot Moscone and Milk, but why?
How could a man so seemingly normal do such a heinous thing? The
focus of the defense expert testimony was not only to answer these
questions, but also to do so in a way that conveyed their internal cer-
tainty of the accuracy of their analysis.
Jurors repeatedly heard the five defense experts testify about the
authority and certainty of their opinions about what had caused Dan
White's actions. Dr. Jones, for example, began his direct examina-
tion by distinguishing his use of the term "depression" from how it is
used "commonly" by the uninitiated. Moreover, he phrased his
causal analysis in an analogy-"it's as though things were filtered
through black glasses"-so that jurors could understand White's dis-
torted perception.7' On cross-examination, Dr. Jones defended his
authority by testifying that "virtually a hundred percent of psychia-
trists" would agree with his diagnosis.s
Cross-examination also proved less than daunting to Dr. Blinder.
Despite the prosecutor's best efforts, the psychiatrist testified
authoritatively on the issue of causation-stressing that Dan White
"wanted to have some understanding as to what was going on, but
because of his mental state, he could not process this information in a
constructive way with lethal consequences., 76 Pressed further by
prosecution questions, Dr. Blinder maintained the aura of certitude.
"[T]he psychiatric information that I have," he asserted, "goes to-
wards great impairment of the mental processes... as is necessary
for the formation of malice.
77
Later, during direct examination, Dr. Solomon invoked terms of
his art-"a uni-polar depressive reaction"-to define Dan White's
mental state,78 as well as explaining analogously "in laymen's terms"
during cross-examination that the defendant "was sort of on auto-
matic pilot" during the shootings. 9 Without qualification, Dr. Solo-
mon testified that Dan White "did not have a mental capacity, to
maturely and meaningfully premeditate and deliberate."'
The two other experts testifying for the defense sustained their
certainty about Dan White's suffering from mental illness in a more
73. See Salter. supra note 70, at 131.
74. Id. at 133.
75. Id. at 138.
76. Id. at 203.
77. Id. at 204.
78. Id. at 210.
79. Id. at 229.
80. Id. at211-12.
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qualified manner. On direct examination, Dr. Delman firmly testi-
fied that Dan White's "capacity to deliberate and premeditate was
substantially impaired," and that the defendant lacked "the capacity
to have malice."'" Cracking under cross-examination, the psycholo-
gist was more tentative, responding "I don't believe so" when ques-
tioned whether Dan White was capable of deliberation.' And re-
sponding to the question why Dan White shot George Moscone twice
in the head after the mayor was already down, Dr. Delman re-
sponded that he really had "no idea why that happened.""
In subsequent testimony, Dr. Lunde also testified unequivocally
on direct examination that Dan White "not only did not premeditate
or deliberate these killings, but as a result of his mental condition, he
was not capable of any kind of mature, meaningful reflection."' But
the psychiatrist qualified the force of a figurative explanation as
"contradictory and ironic" when he further testified that "for such a
person the American Dream is a nightmare, for somebody like Dan
White."s Nonetheless, on cross examination, Dr. Lunde bolstered
his position by asserting that he "would be very surprised if more
than one out of a thousand psychiatrists did not come up with the
same diagnosis.""
Suppressing concerns about morality and stressing their objec-
tivity, the defense's experts articulated an otherness in their status
that supported their nearly unanimous claims of certitude. They
stood above the fray that afflicted mere laypeople, but they were wen
versed enough to explain scientific concepts in analogies that lay
people could understand. In the unshakable opinion of the defense
experts, Dan White's actions were caused by his mental illness.
The expert witnesses properly stressed the issue of causation, yet
to a remarkable degree they also usurped the jurors' prerogative to
decide matters of guilt and innocence. Ironically, Dr. Blinder, the
now famous author of the "Twinkie" defense,' opposed this use of
psychiatric testimony. Courts, he complained, "tend to place psychia-
try in a position where it doesn't belong, where it becomes simply the
sole arbiter between guilt and innocence, in certain kinds of crimes,
whether or not a man is insane."" Furthermore, he criticized courts
for contributing to "the problem in trying to directly equate psychiat-
81. hM at 234.
82. Id at 241.
83. Id at 242.
84. Id. at 252.
85. Id at 249.
86. Id. at 255.
87. Id at 184.
88. Id. at 182.
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ric findings, psychiatric concepts with legal concepts."8 9 Nonetheless,
every expert witness for the defense contributed testimony vouching
for the dynamic quality of emotional stability.
Dr. Blinder opined on direct examination that brutal changes in
Dan White's world diminished his capacity for criminal guilt: "[I]f it
were not for all the tremendous pressures on him the weeks prior to
the shooting, and perhaps if it were not for the ingestion of this ag-
gravating factor, this junk food ... I suspect that these homicides
would not have taken place."'
Turning this argument inside out on cross-examination, Dr.
Solomon directed jurors' attention to the permanence in Dan White's
behavior. His otherwise suspicious reloading of his gun after shoot-
ing George Moscone was explained away as "the sort of automatic
action that he had always been taught."9' And yet, Dr. Solomon testi-
fied, Dan White "was out of control and in an unreasonable state"
during the shooting as opposed to before.' Asserting both poles of
permanence and change, Dr. Solomon could be said to have ex-
hausted the rhetorical alternatives but, more likely, he was respond-
ing less than adroitly to the pressure of cross-examination.
Finally, but curtly, Dr. Lunde asserted both types of rhetorical
claims. On direct examination, he stressed the "change of appetite"
that was "quite striking" in Dan White's case history.93 On cross-
examination, the psychiatrist testified that White "was literally not
focusing" when he shot George Moscone twice in the head. " Moreo-
ver, in both shootings, the defendant "was not necessarily acting in
anger."9'5 Dr. Lunde's testimony provided the defense with a rhetori-
cal summation of the heartiest argument against the defendant's
guilt: White's understandable response to irresistible change.
The prosecution confronted the defense team's battery of five
experts testifying about cause and effect, and four experts testifying
about guilt and innocence (Dr. Delman was unwilling to frame the
issue in those terms), with one expert, Dr. Levy. His testimony, al-
though rhetorically polished, failed to avert a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder. Addressing cause and effect, he
claimed greater scientific accuracy in his opinion because-unlike the
defense's experts-he interviewed Dan White shortly after the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 191.
91. Id. at 226.
92. Id. at 226.
93. Id. at 248.
94. Id. at 267.
95. Id. at 270.
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shootings." He also pointedly denied "any prevailing psychiatric
opinion" that eating junk food such as Twinkies was related "to any
type of mental illness."' Addressing guilt and innocence, he asserted
that the defendant was capable of malice in his actions." The prose-
cution was content to rest on this simple refutation of the defense's
experts, believing that White's confession and the facts spoke for
themselves.
What lessons can be drawn from a rhetorical analysis of the ex-
pert testimony presented in the White case? A primary lesson is that
advocates cannot rely on the facts to tell the whole story. Even ex-
pert testimony based on the most reliable scientific methods cannot
persuade on its own.' The verdict in the White case was not due to
expert testimony on the "Twinkie" defense, but rather due to the
prosecution's inability to use expert testimony together with other
evidence to tell a compelling story about cause and effect-to explain
to the jury how a "normal" guy such as Dan White could murder
Harvey Milk and George Moscone in cold blood. This point may
seem like a tremendous grasp of the obvious, but it is often tempting
to reach for a simpler explanation of an unpopular verdict-the jury
was simply swayed by another huckster expert witness using a crack-
pot pseudo-scientific theory.
A secondary lesson from the White case was the link between
expert testimony and substantive and procedural law reform. The
expert testimony regarding White's emotional state revealed the so-
cietal unacceptability of arguments based on "diminished capacity."
The people of California passed an initiative abolishing the use of
diminished capacity as a defense in criminal cases.' Nonetheless, re-
cent commentators have noted that the constitutional requirement of
due process requires that the defendant be permitted to present evi-
dence that negates the existence of the defendant's capacity to pre-
meditate and deliberate, an essential element of the prosecution for
first degree murder. 1'
The major evidentiary law reform that stems from the White
case is the limitation of California Penal Code section 29, which pre-
vents the kind of expert testimony given by White's experts where
96. See id. at 306.
97. IiL at 317.
98. See id at 316.
99. One can attribute the same fault to the prosecution in the state trial of the
L.A.P.D. officers accused of beating Rodney King; not even a videotape "speaks for it-
self." The advocates must shape the evidence, including expert testimony, into a narra-
tive that resolves the conflicts in the minds of the jurors.
100. Initiative, June 8, 1982.
101. See DAvID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 6-1.3 (1997).
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they testified directly on the issue of his guilt or innocence. This pro-
vision prohibits the expert from stating an opinion on whether the ac-
cused had the mens rea of the offense charged at the time of the
crime, something the experts in the White case did repeatedly.02 A
similar revision was made to the Federal Rules of Evidence, follow-
ing the verdict in the trial of John Hinkley who shot President
Ronald Reagan.' 3 Hinkley was found not guilty by reason of insan-
ity. These law reform efforts are direct responses to the societal un-
acceptability of expert speech. While we may tolerate expert testi-
mony on issues of causation and we permit experts to provide context
regarding mental illness or disease, we will not allow them to usurp
the role of jurors in passing on guilt and innocence.
Note that, despite the public attention and press surrounding the
"Twinkie defense," no law reform was deemed necessary to prohibit
that particular "scientific" theory. Indeed, when interviewed follow-
ing the verdict, the jurors discussed the burden of proof and the
prosecution's failure to prove premeditation "beyond a reasonable
doubt," but none of them relied on "the Twinkie defense."'0 '
The ultimate lesson of the use of expert testimony in the White
case is that the problem of expert credibility is complex and multi-
faceted. And yet, commentators and courts are fixated on the one
issue of the scientific validity of the basis of expert testimony, con-
ducting and attending seminars on statistics and the scientific
method, while the other issues of the ethos of experts are neglected.
Conclusion
The stakes surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony are
higher than ever before, a fact that has crept into the calculus of what
kind of expert testimony should be allowed as the basis for decision.
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, reflects this reality:
[M]odern life, including good health as well as economic well-being,
depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances, such
as chemicals. And it may, therefore, prove particularly important
to see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping function, so that
they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can
generate strong financial incentives to reduce, or to elminate, pro-
duction, points towards the right substances and does not destroy
the wrong ones.05
102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1988).
103. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b) and accompanying advisory committee's note.
104. See Dan White, Juror: It's Been Hell, How Case Changed Their Lives, S.F.
CHRON., July 14, 1983, at 1, 4-5.
105. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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While we may all agree with Justice Breyer that the "right sub-
stances" should be destroyed through the "powerful engine of tort li-
ability," he begs the essential questions-how, and who, shall deter-
mine what those substances are?'O' Evidence law plays a crucial role
in answering these questions.
In a speech shortly following the issuance of the Joiner decision,
Justice Breyer reiterated a theme he began in Joiner, urging judges to
use their power to appoint special masters or specially trained law
clerks under Federal Rule of Evidence 706."
Buried in his speech, however, was a paragraph that did not re-
ceive as much press attention, but is an exceedingly important state-
ment, given the subject of this Symposium and, in particular, this Ar-
ticle. Justice Breyer stated:
Finally, a court proceeding, such as a trial, is not simply a search for
dispassionate truth. It must serve other important values as well.
The law must be fair. And, in our country, it must always seek to
protect basic human liberties. One important procedural safe-
guard, guaranteed by our Constitution's Seventh Amendment, is
the right to a trial by jury. Any effort to bring better science into the
courtroom must respect the jury's constitutionally specified role-
even if doing so means, from time to time, what is, from a scientific
perspective, an incorrect result.
103
The only way Justice Breyer can have an approach that both re-
spects the need to have reliable results and respects the role of the
jury in evaluating the ethos of expert testimony is to make the admis-
sibility of expert testimony-whether it is to be used at trial or used
to support or to oppose a summary judgment motion-subject to the
sufficiency standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b). This may
produce some results that Justice Breyer's specially-appointed sci-
ence experts may not like. However, while we do not permit juries to
be irrational, we have always given juries the right to be wrong, at
least in the eyes of the losing party.
Expert testimony is opinion, "mere" rhetoric. It may or may not
be useful as evidence. When it is admitted into evidence, its proba-
tive force is determined by the ethos of its speakers as viewed from
the perspective of the audience of judges and juries, who are in turn
106. Id.
107. Justice Breyer ventured one possible answer to this question-encouraging
judges to appoint their own experts to advise the court. Justice Breyer acknowledged that
this alternative is seldom used at present, but speculated that it could become more com-
mon with help of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which has
begun a pilot program, developing a list of experts to assist the court in various areas. See
Stephen G. Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Feb. 16, 1998).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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reflecting societal beliefs, attitudes and values about experts. Thus,
analyzing and understanding the conceptual frameworks within
which expert witnesses express their opinions is as essential as evalu-
ating the basic reliability of any scientific theories on which they rely.
Because the community of evidence scholars and judges are, at pres-
ent, too fixated on the latter issue, they will produce an incomplete
and undemocratic response to the problem of expert testimony.
When the expert touches on matters such as guilt or innocence,
such as in the White case, or in civil cases, liability, such testimony
raises problems for study and criticism by both rhetoricians con-
cerned with law and lawyers concerned with rhetoric, as the expert
begins to supplant the role of the jury. At times, as in the White case,
the tension among the roles of the expert, judge and jury will reach a
critical point in the eyes of those observing public trials. There will
be calls for reform of evidence rules regarding expert speech.
The recent critical discussions of expert testimony have taken
place in appellate courts, training seminars, law reviews, popular
press and television talk shows-far removed from the courthouses
wherein such testimony is actually used. We need to look at expert
testimony as a process of communication-expert testimony is testi-
mony, speech, argument, rhetoric-and in considering it as such may
help us see where we have gone astray. While the natural and social
sciences and the law may speak different languages, the constraints of
the adversary system demand that we treat the problem of the ethos
of experts pragmatically.
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